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Abstract
A manifest trend is that larger and more productive human groups
shift from distributed to centralised decision-making. Voluntary theories
propose that human groups shift to hierarchy to limit scalar stress, i.e.
the increase in cost of organisation as a group grows. Yet, this hypothe-
sis lacks a mechanistic model to investigate the organisational advantage
of hierarchy and its role on its evolution. To fill this gap, we describe
social organisation by the distribution of individuals’ capacity to influ-
ence others. We then integrate this formalisation into models of social
dynamics and evolutionary dynamics. First, our results demonstrate that
hierarchy strongly reduces scalar stress, and that this benefit can emerge
solely because leaders and followers differ in their capacity to influence
others. Second, the model demonstrates that this benefit can be sufficient
to drive the evolution of leader and follower behaviours and ultimately,
the transition from small egalitarian to large hierarchical groups.
Keywords: Hierarchy, leadership, evolution, consensus decision-making
Start a war or negotiate peace? Invest in more capital stocks or sell shares?
The fate of states, companies and organisations are shaped by their decisions.
It is then surprising that only a minority of individuals are involved in the
decision-making process. From companies to political parties, organisations
tend to follow an “iron law of oligarchy”, in which larger and more productive
groups switch to hierarchy where a few individuals possess most of the political
power, resources and influence [1]. This transition is best illustrated by the
deep overhaul of human societies initiated by the advent of agriculture 12,500
years ago. In a relative short period of time, most human groups switched
from non-hereditary and facultative forms of leadership [2, 3], to hierarchical
societies with one or few permanent leaders [4]. Despite this transition being
well known, it is still hard to explain why human groups follow this general
trend. The independent transitions to hierarchy and its pervasive presence sug-
gest that the emergence of hierarchy is (at least partly) the result of natural
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selection [5]. But the emergence of hierarchy appears as a Darwinian para-
dox because leaders often enjoy preferential access to resources [4] and mating
partners [6]. Why would any individual rationally accept a position of being
a follower if the position of leader is more beneficial? One could argue that
followers do not have a choice because leaders impose their dominance using
coercive means. Humans have inherited traits and preferences towards hierar-
chy from their primate ancestors, who were organised in dominance hierarchies
where individuals physically compete for rank, resources and partners [2]. But
adaptations such as the capacity to form large coalitions and the development
of throwing weapons led early human groups to reverse this hierarchy [7, 8]. In
pre-Neolithic tribes, coalitions of followers imposed strong dominance on upris-
ing leaders and successfully avoided coercive leaders for hundreds of thousand
of years [2]. Therefore, coercive theories fail to explain the emergence of hier-
archy in the first place when any advanced form of coercion, e.g. armies, taxes
or propaganda, was absent.
An alternative theory from political sciences proposes that in the absence
of financial or military power, leaders have established their dominance by first
accumulating political power, i.e. influence over collective decisions [1]. The
“iron law of oligarchy” states that political leaders inevitably arise as a group
expands, in order to deal with the complexity of coordination. But, this allows
these leaders to bias collective decisions in their favour, e.g. distribution of
resources or command of a military. This theory fits well with evidence of
leaders playing a prevalent role in group organisation [9]. As can be seen in small
scale societies [10] or in a modern share-holder meeting [11], leaders reduce the
cost of organisation by assigning roles to individuals, settling arguments between
decision makers, and helping to decide the future course of action. However, this
theory suggests that the group benefit would be enough to overcome individual
selection driving everyone to become a leader rather than a follower [12]. There
is clearly a conflict between individual and group interests, which makes this
condition non trivial [13].
The “iron law of oligarchy” proposes that a key element is scalar stress,
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which describes the fact that the difficulty for a group to coordinate increases
with group size [1]. This relation appears in (i) psychology experiments of
collective decision-making, in which larger groups reach a lesser degree of agree-
ment [14] or take worse decisions [15], and (ii) indirectly in anthropological
data showing a strong correlation between group size and probability of group
fission [16] or group size and the number of political units [17]. On one side
of the range, small-whale hunters of Mackenzie Inuits have one single coach to
coordinate group hunting [18]. On the other extreme, complex states or com-
panies have dozens of politicians and managers who are fully dedicated to the
task of organising. Previous work has shown that scalar stress can drive the
evolution of institutionalised hierarchy [19], where a leader is appointed by a
centralised process. However, rather than being ascribed, hierarchy is likely to
initially emerge from the evolution of intrinsic physical and psychological traits
of individuals, e.g. height [20], talkativeness and charisma [21]. Emblematic
examples of such informal hierarchy are the ”big man” societies observed in
Melanesia, in which leaders are defined by their persuasion skills rather than by
an ascribed position [22]. But explaining the evolution of “informal” hierarchy
without supporting institutions poses an important challenge: can the group
benefit of hierarchy overcome the selection pressure pushing everyone to be a
leader? The lack of a mechanistic model describing the effect of hierarchy on
collective decision-making has limited investigation of scalar stress as a possible
solution.
The iron law of oligarchy [1] and behavioural experiments [23] suggest that
the benefit of hierarchy on group coordination lies in its effect on the time
a group spends to reach consensus and take a collective decision. Consensus
decision-making is an efficient method for a group to coordinate, in particu-
lar to tackle tasks where learning the optimal strategy by trial and error is
too costly. Examples of consensus decision-making include tribe gatherings
to discuss the next camp location, councils of war to decide upcoming battle
strategies, or parliamentary debates on new laws. Yet, the time spent to reach
consensus (consensus time in short) is costly because individuals dedicate time
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to organisation instead of carrying out the actual task, and because time itself
can carry a cost, e.g. resources get depleted. Thus, we explicitly model the
consensus decision-making and the effect of hierarchy on this process. We de-
scribe group social organisation as a distribution of individuals’ influence, i.e.
their capacity to modify another individual’s opinion toward their own. The
scale from acephalous to highly hierarchical groups is represented by an equal
to strongly-positively-skewed distribution of influence. We use the term leaders
and followers to describe individuals with high and low influence, respectively.
This definition of hierarchy does not include the degree of inequality in re-
sources, which we define as the skewness of the distribution of resources. We
allow the correlation between hierarchy and degree of inequality in resources to
emerge from the model, as influential individuals can bias the distribution of
resources to their advantage. The emergence of hierarchy is represented by the
evolution of individual behaviours towards a minority of leaders and a majority
of followers. We combine social and evolutionary dynamics to investigate the
development of hierarchy and build a mechanistic formalisation of the “iron law
of oligarchy”. Using this model, we aim to answer the following question: does
hierarchy limit the effect of scalar stress, and if yes, could it drive the evolution
of leader and follower behaviours even if it creates inequality in resources? To
do so, we consider that in absence of advanced institutions such as voting sys-
tems, collective decision-making is a sequence of communications, as observed in
human groups faced to coordination problems in laboratory experiments [24] or
in real world [25, 2]. Thus, we mathematically describe collective decision mak-
ing by an opinion formation model, which consists of a sequence of discussions
between individuals until a global consensus is reached [26].
We investigate how social organisation affects scalar stress, where scalar
stress is defined as the relationship between the time spent to reach consensus
and group size. It has been hypothesised that scalar stress is enough to drive
the evolution of stable hierarchy [27]. We test this hypothesis in the second half
of the paper by explicitly integrating the consensus decision-making into an
evolutionary model. We consider a population structured into patches, where
5
individuals on a patch organise together to produce a collective good. The
consensus time determines their cost of organisation, and the influence of an in-
dividual on the final decision determines that individual’s share of the collective
good.
Opinion formation model
Model definition
We developed an opinion formation model based on previous work [28], which
simulates a sequence of discussions between N individuals until consensus is
reached. The outline of the model is represented in the top part of supple-
mentary Figure 1. Individuals are represented by an opinion x. The opinion x
describes a generic opinion of an individual on how to realise a collective task
e.g. the next raid target, the plan of an irrigation system or the value of a law.
Individuals are also described by a value of influence, α. The influence, α, is
defined as the capacity of one individual to influence group decision and affects
(i) the capacity of one individual to modify the opinion of another individual
towards its own opinion, (ii) the reluctance of an individual to change its opin-
ion, and (iii) the probability that an individual talks to other individuals. These
three traits, i.e. persuasiveness, stubbornness and talkativeness, are highly cor-
related in leaders personalities [21] and are the key factors in explaining how
leaders affect consensus decision-making [28].
Both the opinion x and the influence α are continuous variables defined
on [0,1]. To facilitate the analysis of the opinion formation model, we divide
individuals into two profiles: leader L, and follower F. Each profile has a fixed
value of influence α such that αL > αF.
At the beginning of the opinion formation model, the values of opinion x are
sampled from the uniform distribution between [0, 1]. Each time step is defined
by one discussion event during which one speaker talks to multiple listeners.
The probability P of an individual i to be chosen as a speaker s is an increasing
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function of its α value as follows:
Pi(t) =
(αi(t))
k∑N
n=1(αn(t))
k
. (1)
The exponent k defines how much the difference in influence is translated into a
difference in the probability to talk. In the simulations we chose k = 4 so that
in a group of 1000 individuals with the most extreme hierarchy, the probability
that a leader is chosen as a speaker is very high (close to 90%).
The speaker talks with Nl listeners, with listeners being a subset of the
total group. We assume that the number of listeners is limited because of time
constraints. The listeners are randomly sampled from the other individuals in
the group. We assume that every individual can be chosen as a listener, i.e. the
social network is a complete network.
During a discussion event, a listener v updates its opinion to a value x′v
following the equation below, where v represents the listener and u the speaker:
x′v = xv + (αu − αv)(xu − xv). (2)
We assume that the position of speaker gives a slight influential advantage over
the listeners. Therefore, the minimum difference of influence αu − αv is set
to a positive low value, here 0.01. This assumption is necessary to avoid a
systematic convergence of individual opinions towards those of the individual
with the highest α, a phenomenon not observed in real life. The individuals
repeat the previous step until the following condition is true:
σx < xθ (3)
Consensus is reached when the standard deviation of the opinions σx is inferior
to the threshold xθ. The number of discussion events that occurred to reach
consensus is called the consensus time, t∗. The final decision reached, x∗, is the
mean of the opinions at consensus across individuals. Using this model, we aim
to answer the following question: does hierarchy limit the effect of scalar stress?
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Figure 1: A. Consensus time as a function of the size of the group for three
different types of social organisation: (i) 0 leaders, (ii) 1 leader and (iii) 10
leaders. B. Scalar stress measured by the linear regression coefficient (slope) of
time to reach consensus on group size as a function of number of leaders. The
ribbons represent the standard deviation to highlight the high variance in the
consensus time when multiple leaders are present. 100 independent replicates
have been realised for each group size and social organisation. The parameters
used are Nl = 30, αL = 0.75, αF = 0.25 and xθ = 0.05.
Analysis
Figure 1 shows that the presence of few leaders (i) reduces the consensus time,
and (ii) reduces scalar stress, which is shown by the gradient of consensus time
with respect to group size being smaller. In other words, hierarchy facilitates
organisation by reducing the intensity of scalar stress. Importantly, the differ-
ential quality of information that leaders might posses, and which might lead
to a group with hierarchy making better decisions, is not required to get this
result.
Supplementary Figure 2 shows that hierarchy reduces scalar stress and that
this result is consistent across different leader and follower profiles. It shows that
hierarchy with a single leader has the lowest scalar stress when the difference
in influence between leaders and followers is high. Conversely, hierarchy with
multiple leaders has the lowest scalar stress when the difference in influence
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between leaders and followers is low. This is because multiple influential leaders
(i) can increase divergence by convincing followers towards extreme opinions,
(ii) can convince followers from other leaders and (iii) are slower to themselves
be convinced.
Supplementary Figure 3 demonstrates that the scalar stress is strongly de-
pendent of the number of listeners Nl. It shows that a lower number of listeners
Nl results in an increase in consensus time, in particular for acephalous groups
and multiple leaders hierarchy. This is because a lower number of listeners slows
down the convergence of opinions. In the presence of multiple leaders, it also
reduces the probability that one leader convinces the majority of the group and
thus, favours the formation of clusters of different opinions built around one
stubborn leader. In conclusion, our model demonstrates scalar stress, the ben-
efit of hierarchy in reducing scalar stress, and how this benefit is amplified by
limited interactions as it is the case with a low number of listeners Nl.
Evolutionary model
Model definition
We have shown that the presence of a minority of influential individuals (lead-
ers) and a majority of influenceable individuals (followers) reduces the cost of
organisation and scalar stress. Can this organisational advantage be enough to
drive the evolution of individuals toward leader and follower behaviours even if
it creates inequality in resources?
We answer this using an evolutionary model where we describe social or-
ganisation as a distribution of influence, and use opinion formation to link this
distribution back to the cost of organisation. The life cycle of the evolutionary
model is represented in the top part of supplementary Figure 1. We now let the
trait α carried by individuals evolve. The trait α is transmitted vertically from
parent to offspring, e.g. by social learning, as is common in both hunter-gatherer
groups [29] and modern societies [30]. Unlike the model above, the possible val-
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ues of influence α can take any value in the range [0,1]. We use the terms leader
and follower to designate individuals with high and low influence, respectively.
The trait α mutates following a mutation rate of µ. As α is likely to be at least
partly cultural, we assume a mutation rate higher than for a classical genetic
trait. When a mutation occurs, a random value is sampled from a truncated
Gaussian distribution centred on the current value of the trait, with variance
σ2m.
We study the evolution of α using a standard island model with a population
of individuals that is subdivided into a finite number of patches, Np [31]. We
consider that group size can vary and thus, groups can compete by differential
migration. The life cycle of individuals consists of discrete and non-overlapping
generations, where in each generation the following occur: 1. consensus decision-
making about how to perform a task; 2. performance of the collective task;
3. distribution of resources obtained from the task; 4. reproduction; 5. migration.
The first three steps determinate the reproductive success of an individual,
which we denote by its fitness w.
The fitness of an individual is translated into a number of offspring, which is
drawn from a Poisson distribution centred on its fitness w. After reproduction,
offspring individuals migrate with a probability equal to a fixed migration rate
m. Migrating individuals enter a patch chosen at random from the population
(excluding their natal patch).
More formally, the fitness w of individual i on patch j at time t is described
by the following equation:
wij(t) =
ra
1 +
Nj(t)
K
+ rbij(t). (4)
where Nj(t) is the total number of individuals on patch j. The fitness of an
individual is the sum of (i) an intrinsic growth rate ra, limited by the carrying
capacity K, and (ii) an additional growth rate resulting from the extra resources
produced by the collective task, rbij(t). The additional growth rate rbij(t) is not
limited by the carrying capacity, but competition between individuals is taken
into account during the distribution of collective resources. The additional
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growth rate rbij(t) is calculated as follows:
rbij(t) = βr(1− e−γr(Bj(t)pij(t))). (5)
The term rbij(t) is calculated from a logistic function described by γr and βr,
respectively the steepness and the maximum of the increase in growth rate
induced by the additional resources. The additional resources are given by the
total amount of benefit, Bj(t), multiplied by the share the individual receives,
pij(t). The increase of the growth rate follows a logistic relation because of the
inevitable presence of other limiting factors, e.g. space or other resources.
To produce the additional resources Bj(t), individuals first undergo a con-
sensus decision-making process on their patch, as defined in the previous section
(see equations 1, 2, 3). The consensus time determines the cost of organisation
(equation 6), and the outcome of the consensus decision-making determines the
share of individuals (equation 7) as explained in the following paragraphs. We
do not consider that the decisions taken affect the success of the group except
for the distribution of resources. We investigate the emergence of leaders defined
as influential individuals, as defined in psychology, e.g. in experiments [32], and
as observed in psychological profiles of leaders [21]. In this case where leaders
are not better at taking decisions, integrating the effects of the collective deci-
sion would only result in more noise and not qualitatively change our results.
Exploring the emergence of leaders as more informed individuals can be done
in further work but it is not our focus here.
After consensus is reached, all individuals on a patch take part in the col-
lective task which produces an amount of extra resource Bj(t):
Bj(t) = Bj(t− 1)S + βb
1 + e−γb(Nj(t)−bmid)
− Ctt∗j . (6)
The benefit is calculated from a sigmoid function described by βb, bmid and
γb, respectively the maximum, the group size at the sigmoid’s midpoint, and
the steepness of the increase in the benefit induced by additional participants.
We make the assumption of initial increasing returns to scale, where additional
participants increase the benefit superlinearly [33]. But as is standard in mi-
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croeconomic theory, we also make the conservative assumption that the benefit
of the collective task eventually has diminishing marginal returns which over-
comes the increasing returns to scale because of other limiting factors, e.g. land
available or level of technology [33]. To capture the transmissibility of resources
[34], we assume that a proportion S of the benefit is also present in next gener-
ation. The extra resources are discounted by a cost of organisation proportional
to the consensus time t∗.
This cost is modulated by a parameter Ct, which describes the time con-
straints on group decision-making. The parameter Ct depends on the pressure
of time on the task, for instance, the speed of depletion of resources or the need
to build defences before an enemy arrives. To avoid studying the effect of social
strategy in the collective task, which has already been extensively studied in
the evolution of cooperation literature [35], we consider that all the individuals
on a patch are willing to participate in the collective task once a decision is
reached. The collective task simulates the numerous cooperative tasks realised
during the lifetime of an individual, e.g. hunting of large game or constructing
an irrigation system.
The resources obtained from the collective task are distributed among all
individuals on the patch. We want to test if hierarchy can emerge even if
leaders receive a higher share of the collective resources, which selects against
individuals becoming followers. However, leaders are not clearly designated in
informal hierarchy. We assume that in the absence of coercive means, individuals
can only increase their share by biasing the collective decision towards their own
interests and thus, the share of an individual pij(t) is a function of its realised
influence αr such that:
pij(t) =
1 + dαr(ij) (t)∑Nj
i=1(1 + dαr(ij)(t))
. (7)
The asymmetry of the distribution of the resources is modulated by a parameter
d, which represents the level of ecological inequality. For d = 0, a patch is
totally egalitarian and the influence of an individual does not affect the share of
that individual. Such a scenario is close to the society of pre-Neolithic hunter-
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gatherers [2]. It is assumed for simplicity that d is the same for all patches,
and is determined for example by the state of technology, such as food storage
and military technologies. Nevertheless, different patches can have more or less
despotic distributions of resources due to different distributions of αr values.
The realised influence of an individual αr(ij) is calculated from the difference
between an individual’s initial opinion and the final decision and measures how
much the final decision is close to the individual’s interest:
αr(ij) = 1− |xij(t = 0)− x∗j | (8)
Analysis
We use this model to answer the following question: can the organisational
benefit of hierarchy in the presence of scalar stress lead to the evolution of leader
and follower behaviours even if it creates inequality in resources?. Because of
the nonlinearities of the model, we analyse it using replicated individual-based
simulations.
We define hierarchy as a positively skewed distribution of influence α. The
skewness is measured by the Pearson’s moment coefficient of skewness. We focus
on the effect of the following parameters: (i) the level of ecological inequality
d, and (ii) and the number of listeners Nl, which affects the intensity of scalar
stress (supplementary Figure 3). In the supplementary information, we also
explore the effect of (i) the time constraints on group decision-making Ct, (ii) the
migration rate m, which affects the population structure, and (iii) the absence
of transmission of resources from one generation to another (S = 0). The
default values of these parameters, unless otherwise specified, are for the level
of inequality d = 1, the number of listeners Nl = 30, the time constraints on
group decision-making Ct = 2,the migration rate m = 0.05 and the fraction
of resources transmit to next generation S = 0.9. The default values for the
remaining demographic and ecological parameters are for the number of patches
Np = 50, the initial number of individuals on each patch Nj(0) = 50, the
carrying capacity K = 50, the intrinsic growth rate ra = 2, βb = 10000, γb =
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0.005, bmid = 500, βr = 3 and γr = 0.025. These values are chosen in order to
allow the transition between tribe size (50 to 100 individuals) to small chiefdom
size (500 individuals) [4], and so that additional resources lead to a clearly
increased fitness. The remaining default parameter values are for the consensus
threshold xθ = 0.05, and the mutation process, where µm = 0.01 and σ
2
m = 0.01.
The results presented are the average across patches when the result is a
function of generations, and the average across patches, generations and simu-
lations when the result is a function of a parameter. The error bars represent
the standard error from the mean across replicates. The simulations are run for
10000 generations and the first 5000 generations are ignored to limit the effects
of initial conditions.
The emergence of efficient hierarchy
Figure 2 presents the evolution of the distribution of influence and group size as a
function of generations for a single run. The results shows that despite the wide
range of possible distributions of influence, individuals evolve towards hierarchy,
i.e. a minority of leaders with high influence and a majority of followers with low
influence. In the meantime, the population grows to a large group size. Within
a patch, hierarchy also evolves but the proportion of leaders and followers vary.
The result is stable across replicates and in the long term as shown by Figure 3.A.
At the start of the simulation, groups have a skewness close to 0 and a small
group size because the values of influence are randomly initiated. Figure 3.A
demonstrates that skewness increases with time and remains at a positive value
along generations. The positive skewness reflects a majority of individuals with
low influence – followers – and a minority of individuals with high influence –
leaders. This result is also present in absence of intergenerational transmission
of resources (S = 0) as seen in supplementary Figure 4. Overall, these results
show that hierarchy can emerge from the evolution of individual behaviour and
thus, hierarchy provides a clear evolutionary advantage.
The benefit of an efficient hierarchical organisation is shown in Figure 3.C.
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Figure 2: Evolution of the distribution of influence α, and evolution of average
group size as a function of generations for the whole population (top) and three
different patches (bottom). The plot represents results for a single run. A
column at a given generation is composed of sections with each section showing
the proportion (size of the section) of individuals with a given influence (colour
of the section). Note that there is a small proportion of individuals with high
influence at equilibrium. This proportion is low and thus, hard to discern but
it is revealed by a stripe of orange and white colour at the bottom.
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It shows that over generations, the consensus time and the total amount of
resources both increase. This is because group size increases and leads to more
resources being produced due to increasing returns to scale, but also a greater
difficulty to organise. However, it can be observed in Figure 3.C that the increase
in consensus time stabilises before the end of the increase in extra resources.
This is because individuals have evolved toward hierarchy and can maintain a
low cost of organisation even as the group size and the production of resources
continue to increase. The benefit of hierarchy depends on the time constraints
Ct, which translates the consensus time into an opportunity cost of organisation.
Supplementary Figure 5 shows that the level of hierarchy is proportional to the
time constraints. For a low level of time constraints, the benefit of hierarchy
has a negligible effect on organisation and group production and thus, hierarchy
does not evolve. For tasks with strong time constraints, e.g. warfare, the benefit
of hierarchy is amplified and a strong hierarchy evolves.
Hierarchy evolves because it reduces the cost of organisation and thus pro-
vides the creation of a surplus in group production. This surplus is distributed
among the individuals and increases the number of offspring they produce. This
results in hierarchical groups growing larger and exporting a larger number of
migrants than groups without hierarchy. Most of these migrants are followers
because most of the population within a hierarchy are followers. Ultimately,
these migrants spread hierarchical organisation to other groups and at the pop-
ulation level creates a stable skewed distribution of influence.
Hierarchy and inequality in resources
Importantly, hierarchy evolves even when the emergence of hierarchy creates
inequality in resources. Hierarchy creates inequality in resources because leaders
will more often bring the group decision close to their preferences and thus
receive a higher share of the resources produced, and hence have a larger number
of offspring compared to followers on the same patch. inequality in resources
limits the development of hierarchy because it increases the number of offspring
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Figure 4: Average skewness of the distribution of influence α across 5000 gener-
ations and across 32 replicates as a function of the level of ecological inequality
d and the number of listeners Nl.
leaders produce and potentially drives all individuals within a group to develop
high influence. This effect can be seen in Figure 4.A, which shows that a higher
level of inequality reduces the skewness of the distribution of influence. But
this is limited by the competition between leaders. In the presence of multiple
leaders, a leader can get a lower share of the resource than followers if the group
becomes convinced by another leader during the decision-making process. In
this case, the “losing” leaders are further from the final decision because they
are harder to convince. However, the fact that hierarchy does not evolve for
high levels of inequality shows that this competition is not always enough to
stop the increase in number of leaders and the collapse of hierarchy. The second
reason explaining the evolution of hierarchy despite inequality is that even if
leaders receive more resources, followers still get a higher amount of resources
and offspring than they would in a group without hierarchy, since larger groups
produce more resources due to increasing returns to scale.
The feedback loop between scalar stress, hierarchy and group size
We have seen previously that hierarchy reduces the consensus time but it also
provides a second main advantage to group organisation: it reduces scalar stress.
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To test the importance of this factor in the evolution of hierarchy, we look
at the skewness of the distribution of influence for different values of number
of listeners, Nl. Figure 4.B shows that high scalar stress, i.e. low number of
listeners Nl, leads to the evolution of a more skewed distribution of influence.
On the other hand, a low scalar stress, i.e. here represented by a high number of
listeners Nl, leads to the disappearance of hierarchy. This result shows that the
benefit of reducing scalar stress is a crucial factor in the evolution of hierarchy.
This is because scalar stress creates a positive feedback loop by which hierarchy
increases its own benefit. On the one hand, an efficient hierarchical organisation
allows a group to produce a larger amount of resources and hence reach a larger
size. On the other hand, hierarchy provides a stronger advantage as group size
increases because the cost of organisation increases less in hierarchical groups
than in acephalous groups. There is a feedback loop between hierarchy leading
to larger group size, and larger group size increasing the benefit of hierarchy.
Eventually, this feedback loop comes to an end due to diminishing marginal
returns i.e. other limiting factors than group size. Yet, this feedback loop
amplifies the benefit that hierarchy provides to group members and favours its
evolution.
To summarise, social organisation is the equilibrium between two opposing
forces, competition within groups where inequality pushes individuals to evolve
high influence, and competition between individuals of different groups where
efficient group organisation pushes most individuals to evolve low influence.
Looking closer, hierarchy provides one direct and one indirect benefit [13] to
followers compared to individuals in acephalous groups. First, hierarchy pro-
vides a direct benefit to followers because it increases the amount of surplus
resources produced and thus, it increases the fitness of followers. Second, hier-
archy provides an indirect benefit to followers because it increases the group size
and hence the amount of resources produced in the following generation. This
increases the fitness of followers’ offspring. The contribution of each benefit is
hard to distinguish but their role can be examined by investigating the effect of
high migration rate, which suppresses population structure and indirect benefits
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to offspring on the same patch. Supplementary Figure 6 shows that, considering
moderate time constraints, a high migration rate leads to the disappearance of
hierarchy at equilibrium. This highlights the importance of the indirect benefit
to offspring that remain on the patch in sustaining hierarchy. On the other
hand, supplementary Figure 7 shows that hierarchy evolves for any migration
rate if the the time constraints are high. In this case, the direct benefit is high
enough to overcome the cost of inequality in resources. In conclusion, hierarchy
can evolve when time constraints are high through the immediate direct benefit
of producing extra resources, but the indirect benefit resulting from the feed-
back loop between hierarchy, group size and scalar stress allows hierarchy to
evolve over a much wider range of conditions.
Discussion
Group size and the resultant scalar stress have been proposed as a crucial fac-
tor to explain the emergence of hierarchy from previously egalitarian groups
[17, 16, 19]. Yet, the investigation of this in models of either social dynamics or
evolutionary dynamics has been limited so far because a formalisation of hierar-
chy compatible with both types of model was lacking. To fill this gap, we have
described group social organisation by the distribution of an individual trait,
the influence. We have looked at the effect of this distribution on the consensus
time using an opinion formation model, and if this distribution can emerge from
the evolution of individual behaviours in an evolutionary model.
Our results first show that hierarchy reduces the intensity of scalar stress,
i.e. the increase of consensus time as group size grows. This benefit emerges
solely from the difference of influence between leaders and followers. Second,
the results of the evolutionary model show that hierarchy can evolve de novo
in the presence of low initial inequality in resources and increasing returns to
scale, which are both reasonable assumptions for the small egalitarian groups
and societies present during the Neolithic transition [2, 36].
This work expands on previous research in social dynamics and evolutionary
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dynamics by including the role of scalar stress. A previous opinion formation
model shows that heterogeneity in individual persuasiveness and stubborness
can affect the time spent to reach consensus [28].
Our findings confirm this result and show that the shortest consensus time
is reached for a positively skewed distribution of these traits, as observed in
hierarchy. In addition, our results demonstrate that this advantage is greatly
correlated with group size. A previous evolutionary model combining opinion
formation and evolutionary dynamics showed that hierarchy could evolve when
the cost of organisation is high, for example as in warfare [37]. However, the hi-
erarchy obtained was unstable and groups often failed to produce any resources.
The model presented here demonstrates that scalar stress was a crucial missing
factor which, when integrated, leads to the evolution of stable hierarchy and
large groups.
Our model of informal hierarchy extends previous work on institutionalised
hierarchy [19] by showing that this voluntary theory holds even in societies
where political institutions are absent, and thus where inequality creates selec-
tion pressures toward leader behaviours. Furthermore, the opinion formation
model developed here is a first step to move from a benefit of hierarchy that
is simply assumed in the model, to a more mechanistic explanation. Yet, it is
still missing some key aspects of group organisation e.g. individual knowledge or
network structure. Further work should explore how additional factors of group
decision-making could amplify or reduce the role of hierarchy in organisation.
More broadly, our model is in line with theoretical work that proposes that hier-
archy emerged because leaders fulfil an important role for the group e.g. leaders
promote cooperation by monitoring the group and punishing the defectors [38].
Importantly, the explanation explored here is not mutually exclusive with previ-
ous explanations. Rather, it can complete them. Following the previous example
[38], policing in large-scale societies requires efficient decision-making to create
the large number of rules [39] and to manage specialised policing forces.
Our findings predict that the level of hierarchy i.e. skewness of the distribu-
tion of influence, should increase both with the time constraints on the tasks
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tackled by the group and with group size. First, there is extensive evidence that
human groups tackling tasks with high time constraints such as warfare often
switch to a strong hierarchical organisation [40]. Second, previous reviews of
ethnographic data presents evidence that group size scales with political com-
plexity [17, 41, 16]. For example, the Inuit population on coastal North Alaska
are composed of large groups relying on bowhead whale hunting, a complex co-
ordination task. These populations are thus under high scalar stress and exhibit
a strong hierarchy, with leaders who own the hunting equipment deciding the
distribution of resources. In comparison, smaller groups of Inuits living on the
Mackenzie Delta rely on individual hunting and have a less hierarchical organi-
sation [18]. Yet, the generality of a scenario where the cost of organisation drives
the evolution of hierarchy needs to be better estimated with further work ex-
ploring the quantitative relation between individual behaviours, group size and
cost of organisation either in laboratory experiments or in real world human
groups. Other than scalar stress, our findings predict that low initial inequality
in resources and initial increasing returns to scale are necessary for the origin
of hierarchy. Much anthropological evidence shows that inequality in resources
was strongly limited in pre-hierarchical societies because of the absence of food
storage technologies preventing leaders from building up a personal surplus of
resources; and the absence of coercive institutions e.g. dedicated armies and
tax collection [2]. Increasing returns to scale is commonly observed in modern
collective actions and results from synergistic interactions between individuals
such as division of labour and specialisation [42]. Archaeological evidence sug-
gests that agriculture could have provided Neolithic society with such scalable
means of production [43].
In political sciences, the “iron law of oligarchy” proposes a comprehensive
scenario for the emergence of hierarchy and inequality [1]. Our model, combined
with previous research [44, 19], shows that an evolutionary iron law of oligarchy
is a plausible scenario to explain the transition to hierarchy. Expanding human
groups switch to hierarchy by evolution of individual behaviours or by group
decision [19] to limit the costs of large-scale organisation. Later on, leaders use
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their influence to bias the distribution of collective benefits and costs toward
their own interests [44]. Once a few individuals have monopolised economic
power and political power, they can then use these advantages in order to sustain
their domination [45]. The main benefit of this theory is to provide a common
explanation for voluntary and coercive hierarchy. The two opposing sides of
hierarchy emerge from the same mechanism, consensus decision-making, which
is quicker but biased when the distribution of influence is skewed. Although the
iron law was initially proposed to explain human social organisation in the post
industrial revolution era, our model suggests that its explanatory scope might
be wider than first believed. For example, there is evidence that non-human
species also use consensus decision-making to coordinate [46]. While it is hard
to draw conclusions about other species with the current model, further work
could tailor the model to investigate the emergence of leadership in these species.
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